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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
I. RUSSELL V. PRICE: A LIMITATION ON THE USE OF 
DERIVATIVE WORKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Russell v. Price,l the Ninth Circuit held that the unau-
thorized use of a derivative film, on which a copyright had ex-
pired, constituted actionable infringement of a copyright on an 
underlying stageplay under the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 
Act).2 
In 1913 George Bernard Shaw acquired a copyright on his 
stageplay "Pygmalion." In 1941 the renewal copyright was ob-
tained and, originally due to expire after a term of 28 years,S was 
1. 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. Dec. 1979) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members 
were Hug, J., and Thompson, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied sub nom. Drebin 
v. Russell, 48 U.S.L.W. 3750 (May 20, 1980). 
2. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-
216 (1976» (amended 1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1909 Act]. In 1976, the 1909 Act 
was superseded in its entirety by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)[hereinafter cited as the 
1976 Act], fully effective as of January 1, 1978. As Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th 
Cir. 1979) arose under the 1909 Act, all references are to that version of the statute, 
unless noted otherwise. 
Derivative works were given explicit statutory protection for the first time in the 
1909 Act. Originally enacted as § 6, the provision pertaining to derivative copyright was 
changed to § 7 by the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 655 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 7) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976» [hereinafter cited as § 7]. Section 7 
provided that: 
Compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, 
dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the 
public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with 
the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, 
or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as 
new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this 
title; but the publication of any such new works shall not af-
fect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the 
matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply 
an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to se-
cure or extend copyright in such original works. 
3. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1080 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 24 (1976» (amended 1976). Section 23 provided, in pertinent part: 
The copyright secured by this title shall endure for twenty-
323 
1
Moyles and Lashnits: Intellectual Property
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
324 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVmW [Vol.ll:323 
extended by a series of congressional acts, culminating in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act).4 Shaw licensed the pro-
duction of a motion picture version of the stageplay. The licen-
sees produced and copyrighted a film, and in 1966 the film copy-
right was allowed to expire. Shaw died in 1950, and the 
plaintiffs, legatees under his will (except Janus Films, a licen-
see), became proprietol~s of the copyright. 
In 1971, the proprietors of the stageplay copyright granted 
an exclusive license to Janus Films to distribute the film. In 
1972 Janus learned that defendant was renting copies of the 
film, and after unsuccessfully pressing a claim for unfair compe-
tition in state court,5 brought an action for copyright infringe-
ment in the federal district court.6 
Relying on the reclent Second Circuit decision in Rohauer v. 
eight years from the date of first publication [provided that 
the author or his otatutory beneficiaries] shall be entitled to a 
renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a fur-
ther term of twenty-eight years when application for such re-
newal and extension shall have been made to the copyright 
office and duly registered therein one year prior to the expira-
tion of the original term of the copyright: And provided fur-
ther, That in default of the registration of such application for 
renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall deter-
mine at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first 
publication. 
Section 23 was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (amended 1976) by the Act of July 30, 
1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 659 [hereinafter cited as § 24]. 
The renewal system has been abandoned for copyrights arising on or after January 
I, 1978, by the 1976 Act, and replaced with a single term copyright couplea with a provi-
sion for termination of transfers. 1976 Act, supra note 2, §§ 203, 302. 
4. When efforts to revise the existing copyright law were undertaken, it was antici-
pated that the copyright term would be extended. To prevent unfair hardships to copy-
right owners whose term would have otherwise expired before the revisions would have 
been enacted, a series of bills were passed, each extending existing copyrights until the 
next such bill. When the 1976 Act, supra note 2, became effective, all became subject to 
§ 304{b) thereof, which provides: 
The duration of IIny copyright, the renewal term of which is 
subsisting at any time between December 31, 1976, and De-
cember 31,1977, inclusive, or for which renewal registration is 
made between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, in-
clusive, is extended to endure for a term of seventy-five years 
from the date copyright was originally secured. 
5. Janus Films, Inc. v. Budget Films, Inc., 57 Cal. App. 3d 490, 127 Cal. Rptr. 204 
(1976). This case was ordered unpublished and is therefore of no force or effect. 
6. Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
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Killiam Shows, Inc.,'1 defendant argued that a derivative copy-
right proprietor has a right to use the derivative work indepen-
dently of any underlying copyright, and that this right enters 
the public domain with the expiration of the derivative 
copyright. s 
The district court rejected defendant's interpretation of 
Rohauer on the ground that Rohauer turned on contractual 
provisions not present in Russell.9 Relying on the fundamental 
rule of copyright law that the protection of a derivative copy-
right encompasses only the original contributions of the deriva-
tive work, the court reasoned that only original work enters the 
public domain when a derivative copyright expires.10 Because 
exhibition of the film necessarily involved use of material from 
the underlying play, the court concluded that defendant's use 
thereof constituted an infringement of plaintiff's copyright. 
Focusing on the factual differences between the cases, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that Rohauer 
did not control the issues in Russell, and adopted the district 
court's analysis of the scope of derivative copyright protection.ll 
B. DERIVATIVE COPYRIGHT: AN INDEPENDENT PROPERTY 
INTEREST? 
A fundamental issue underlying the controversy in Russell 
was whether the creator of a derivative work acquires a property 
interest independent of any copyright on underlying material 
which permits continued exploitation of the derivative work 
even after all licenses to use the underlying material have termi-
nated. The majority of courts which have addressed this ques-
7. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.)~ cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). 
8. Defendant also contended that plaintiff's delay in instituting the infringement 
action engendered by the litigation in state court constituted laches, and that Janus 
Films lacked standing to bring the action. The district court rejected both of these argu-
ments. Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303, 305 (C.D. Cal. 1977). On appeal, defendant 
repeated his laches argument, and also disputed the district court's treatment of the 
issues of damages and attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on 
all points. 612 F.2d at 1126, 1132. These defenses are beyond the scope of this Note and 
will not be given further consideration. 
9. Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303, 305 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
10. Id. For a discussion of this rule, see 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1979). 
11. 612 F.2d at 1128. 
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tion have concluded that no such property interest exists.12 In 
essence, these courts have reasoned that because a derivative 
copyright protects only the original contributions of a creator, 
the fact that a derivative work has been copyrighted does not 
give rise to a right to UlSe underlying material. Under this view, 
any right to use copyrighted underlying material must find its 
source in contractual arrangements between the parties. 
. In Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,lS however, Judge 
Friendly advanced a different rationale. The Rohauer court, in 
reaching the holding that the unlicensed use of the derivative 
work in issue there did not infringe an underlying copyright, re-
lied in part on the view that once a derivative work is copy-
righted, a property intorest in the entire derivative work springs 
into existence, permitting use of that work without regard to the 
underlying copyright.14 
In Rohauer, the author of the novel Sons of the Sheik li-
censed the exclusive right to make motion pictures based on the 
novel. Under the terms of the license, the author promised to 
renew her copyright 011 the novel, and to convey her motion pic-
ture rights for the renewal term to the original grantee or his 
assigns. The author died, however, before the end of the first 
term, and the renewal right devolved to her daughter as a statu-
tory beneficiary under section 24 of the 1909 Act.lII A motion 
picture was produced under the license, and a copyright was ob-
tained. The copyright was renewed, and passed by successive as-
12. E.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); G. 
Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 
849 (1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). 
13. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). 
14. [d. at 492. The view has been called the new property right theory. Professor 
Nimmer described this theory as follows: 
[O]nce a derivative work is created pursuant to a valid license 
to use the underlying material, a new property right springs 
into existence with respect to the entire derivative work, so 
that even if the license is thereafter terminated the proprietor 
of the derivative work may nevertheless continue to use the 
material from the underlying work as contained in the deriva-
tive work. 
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 3.07 at 3-23. The Second Circuit's reliance on the theory 
was not without precedent. See Edmonds v. Stem, 248 Fed. 897 (2d Cir. 1918); Sunset 
Sec. Co. v. Coward McCann, Inc., 297 P.2d 137, 110 U.S.P.Q. 329 (Cal. 1956), vacated, 47 
Cal. 2d 907, 306 P.2d 777 (1956). 
15. 1909 Act, supra note 3. 
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signment to the defendant. The author's daughter renewed her 
copyright on the underlying novel, and assigned her interest 
therein to the plaintiff. When the defendant permitted exhibi-
tion of the film without the permission of the plaintiff, the plain-
tiff sued for copyright infringement. 
Plaintiff argued that the license under which the film was 
created was terminated when the copyright on the novel was re-
newed, and that the unlicensed use of the film diminished the 
"force" of the underlying copyright within the meaning of sec-
tion 7 of the 1909 Act.1e Defendant countered that adequate 
"force" was given plaintiff's copyright if the creation of new de-
rivative works was prevented, and that section 7 was not in-
tended to forbid the continued use of a derivative work created 
under license from the underlying copyright proprietor, even if 
that license had lapsed.1'1 
In holding for the defendant, the court confronted both the 
"force or validity" language of section 7 and the line of authority 
which held that the exercise of renewal rights by a statutory suc-
cessor under section 24 created a new estate, free and clear of 
any first term licensing arrangements.18 Focusing on slight 
changes made in the text of section 7 before it was enacted in its 
final form,19 the court concluded that the force or validity clause 
was intended only to prevent the possibility of forfeiture of a 
copyright on underlying material as a result of improper publi-
cation by the proprietor of a derivative work.20 The court 
avoided application of the new estate doctrine by distinguishing 
prior decisions interpreting the doctrine on the ground that 
16. 551 F.2d at 488. The relevant portions of § 7 are set forth in supra note 2. 
17. 551 F.2d at 488. 
18. An exercise of renewal rights under § 24, supra note 3, has been traditionally 
viewed as creating a new estate, unrestricted by prior agreements. See, e.g., Fox Films 
Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923). The new estate doctrine was significantly reo 
stricted by Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), which 
held that an author was bound by an assignment of his rights to the renewal term. But 
such an assignment is ineffective against the statutory beneficiaries under § 24 if the 
author fails to survive to the renewal term. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, 
Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960). By permitting the derivative copyright proprietor to prevail 
against the statutory beneficiary, the Second Circuit created a significant exception to 
the prevailing interpretation of § 24. 
19. 551 F.2d at 488·89 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the legislative history on 
which the court relied, see text accompanying notes 31·35 infra. 
20. ld. at 489·90. 
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none of those cases involved an attempt to assign derivative 
rights for both the first and renewal terms.21 In light of this dis-
tinction,22 and its interpretation of section 7, the court con-
cluded that the continued use· of underlying material, as con-
tained in the derivative film, did not infringe the underlying 
copyright in the noveP3 
C. THE Russell Court's Analysis 
The defendant in Bussell argued that the Rohauer decision 
did not depend on the contractual provisions in issue in 
Rohauer, but could be asserted as an independent principle of 
copyright law.24 In defendant's View, Rohauer stood for the sim-
ple proposition that, although new derivative works could not be 
created without a license, the use of underlying material, as con-
tained in a derivative work, did not infringe on an underlying 
copyright. Consequently, defendant's argument continued, when 
the derivative copyright in Russell expired, the derivative copy-
right proprietor's right to use underlying material entered the 
public domain. 
Focusing on the factual differences between the cases, the 
Russell court declined to adopt the extension of Rohauer urged 
on it by defendant. The defendant in Rohauer was both the as-
signee of a contract in which the author promised to convey the 
renewal term derivative rights in issue there, and the proprietor 
21. Id. at 490-91. 
22. In support of its analysis, the court noted what it felt was a disagreement among 
commentators, id. at 492-93, and the "equities [which] lie 'preponderantly in favor of the 
proprietor of the derivative copyright [who will] often have made contributions literary, 
musical and economic, as great or greater than the original author." Id. at 493. In the 
court's opinion Congress had these equities in mind when it drafted the 1976 Act, supra 
note 2. Sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act provide: 
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant 
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the 
terms of the grant after its termination but this privilege does 
not extend to the preparation after the termination of other 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by 
the terminated grant. 
Id. at 494. The court's reliance on these provisions is questionable at best. Section 
304(c)(3) of the 1976 Act expressly preserves the renewal term for the copyrights arising 
under the 1909 Act. In limiting the renewal rights of the statutory beneficiary, the court 
appears to have contradicted the clear thrust of § 304(c)(3). 
23. Id. at 494. 
24. Appellants' Opening Brief at 21, Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied sub nom. Drebin v. Russell, 48 U.S.L.W. 3750 (May 20, 1980). 
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of an unexpired derivative copyright. The Russell court rea-
soned, therefore, that Rohauer required a reconciliation of com-
peting derivative and underlying copyright interests.215 In con-
trast, the Russell defendant asserted neither a contractual 
interest, nor a right as the proprietor of a copyright, but simply 
claimed a naked right to use the film as a member of the public. 
On the basis of these factual differences, the Russell court 
deemed an important policy consideration underpinning 
Rohauer to be inapplicable to Russell.26 The Rohauer court, in 
reaching its conclusion, was motivated by a concern for the pro-
tection of the economic and artistic contributions of the deriva-
tive copyright proprietor.2'1 The Rohauer court sought to avoid 
the forfeiture of these contributions by the somewhat fortuitous 
failure of the author to survive to the renewal term. Because the 
defendant in Russell was merely a member of the public who 
had made no contribution to the production of the derivative 
work, these concerns were absent. 
Having found Rohauer inapplicable to Russell, the court re-
sorted to the fundamental principle of copyright law that a de-
rivative copyright protects only the original contributions of the 
creator of the derivative work/jiB Consequently, only the original 
work in the film entered the public domain on the expiration of 
the derivative copyright, and to the extent that exhibition of the 
film involved exhibition of material from the novel, defendant's 
unlicensed use thereof infringed plaintiff's copyright.2s 
D. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit correctly declined to hold that underly-
ing material contained in a copyrighted derivative work enters 
the public domain as a result of the expiration of the derivative 
copyright. The theory that the acquisition of a derivative copy-
right establishes an independent interest in the entire derivative 
work, approved of by the Rohauer court, rests on questionable 
grounds, even where asserted by the owner of a derivative copy-
25. 612 F.2d at 1128. 
26. ld. at 1127. 
27. 551 F.2d at 493. . 
28. 612 F.2d at 1128. 
29. ld. at 1128. 
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right.30 The theory is even more troublesome when the interest 
in the derivative work is claimed by a member of the public, as 
was the defendant in Russell. 
Arguably, the force or validity clause of section 7 was in-
tended to prevent the precise result reached in Rohauer. As pro-
posed in a preliminary version, section 7 qualified a derivative 
copyright by providing that "no such copyright shall affect the 
force or validity of any subsisting copyright on the matter em-
ployed . . . ."31 As a result of testimony offered in congressional 
hearings on the section recounted in Rohauer,32 the wording was 
changed to "the publication of any such new works shall not 
affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright on the 
matter employed .... "33 The drafters of section 7 were con-
cerned with the possible impact of the publication of a deriva-
tive work on the copyrights on underlying material contained in 
the derivative work. Ullder the law of copyright, publication of a 
work with insufficient notice can result in a public dedication of 
that work. u It was feared that publication of a derivative work 
with legally inadequate notice might inadvertently extinguish 
the copyrights in underlying material. With this change to sec-
tion 7 the drafters sought to minimize the potential forfeiture of 
underlying copyrights. But the very testimony on which the 
Rohauer court relied contained the statement that the modifica-
tion was not meant to "change the intent of the section in any 
way."35 Thus, although it is clear that the force or validity clause 
was concerned with the problem of publication with inadequate 
notice, it is not clear, as presumed in Rohauer, that the clause 
was intended to serve this purpose only. To the contrary, the 
plain import of the original phrasing suggests that Congress in-
tended the clause to have a much broader effect. The legislative 
history of the force 01' validity clause lends more support to the 
view that any limitation introduced into the clause by the modi-
30. The Rohauer opinion has been strongly criticized. See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 
10, § 3.07 [AJ; Comment, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-New Clarity or Con-
fusion?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 905 (1978). 
31. THE COPYRIGHT BILL, S. 6330, H.R. 19853, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, May 31, 
1906, in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsTOUY OF THE 1909 Am at 15 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 
1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
32. 551 F.2d at 489. 
33. 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTOllY, supra note 31, at 78 (emphasis added). 
34. For a discussion of this principle, see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 4.12 (1979). 
35. Id. at 78. 
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fication was inadvertent than to the position taken in Rohauer. 
Even assuming, however, that the Rohauer court was cor-
rect in its disposition of the force or validity clause, it does not 
follow that the court was thereby free to infer an independent 
interest in an entire derivative work. If the force or validity 
clause were stricken from section 7 altogether, the unlicensed 
use of a derivative work, to the extent that it contained copy-
righted underlying material, would still appear to infringe on the 
various rights guaranteed an underlying copyright proprietor.86 
To reach its holding the Rohauer court apparently inferred that 
the drafters of section 7, in recognizing a derivative copyright, 
also intended to confer an independent interest in the entire de-
rivative work. This inference clearly departs from the traditional 
rule of copyright law that a copyright protects only the original 
contributions of a creator.87 
However section 7 is interpreted, it is clear that a primary 
objective of the drafters of the section was to avoid disruption of 
the existing copyright system.38 To hold that underlying mate-
rial contained in a derivative work falls into the public domain 
upon the expiration of a derivative copyright would clearly frus-
trate this objective. Where the creator of a derivative work has 
borrowed substantially from an underlying work, such a holding 
could have the practical effect of extinguishing the important 
right of a copyright proprietor to control the dissemination of 
copyrighted material in the media employed by the derivative 
work.39 To protect this right, a licensor would be burdened with 
36. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1,35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (1976». Section 1 of the 1909 Act confers on the proprietor of a copyright a 
number of exclusive rights, including, for example, the exclusive right to exhibit a work 
publicly. With or without the force or validity clause, nothing in the language of § 7 of 
the 1909 Act suggests that it was intended to override the rights granted in § 1. 
37. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
38. In addition to the force or validity clause, § 7 of the 1909 Act, supra note 2, 
provided that procurement of a derivative copyright did not imply an exclusive right to 
use an original work, nor could it be used to secure or extend a copyright on an original 
work. This series of limitations, grafted on to the portion of the section recognizing de-
rivative copyright, makes clear the Congressional desire to minimize the disruption of 
the subsisting copyright law. For a discussion of Congressional intent in enacting § 7, see 
Comment, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-New Clarity or Confusion?, supra 
note 30, at 918-21. . 
39. Under Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 949 (1977), the proprietor of an underlying copyright would retain the right to pre-
vent the creation of new derivative works based on the underlying material. ld. at 492. 
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the task of either overseeing the renewal of the derivative copy-
right, or attempting to limit the scope of the derivative copy-
right with contractual provisons. In either case, the force or va-
lidity clause would be effectively rendered superfluous. 
Another argument against permitting the unlicensed use of 
underlying material is the absence of any contribution by mem-
bers of the public to the creation of the derivative work. Unlike 
the proprietor of a derivative copyright, who often makes a sub-
stantial investment in the creation or purchase of a derivative 
work, a member of th'B public generally makes only a relatively 
modest expenditure in acquiring a copy. Consequently, an im-
portant policy consideration underpinning Rohauer is absent 
when a member of the public asserts a right to use underlying 
material. 
In cases arising under the 1976 Act, the argument against 
extending Rohauer is even stronger. Section 103 of the 1976 Act 
provides that "[t]he copyright in a compilation or derivative 
work extends only to the material contributed by the author of 
such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material em-
ployed in the work .... "40 To whatever extent the defendant's 
argument in Russell lhad validity under the 1909 Act, it would 
have been foreclosed by this provision, had the case arisen under 
the 1976 Act. 
Beyond its application to persons claiming a right to use a 
derivative work merely as members of the public, the Russell 
opinion has important implications for the proprietors of 
unexpired derivative copyrights. By holding that a derivative 
copyright protects only the original contributions of its creator, 
the court appears to have implicitly rejected the argument that 
upon copyrighting a derivative work, the proprietor thereof ac-
quires an independent interest in the entire derivative work. 
Thus, although the Ninth Circuit professed to express no opin-
ion on Rohauer,41 the result reached in the two cases depended 
on conflicting interpretations of a fundamental principle of cop-
But the value of this right would be severely attenuated where the derivative work was a 
major production, for example, a major motion picture, and effectively saturated the 
market in that particular media. 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (19'16). 
41. 612 F.2d 1123, 1126 n.10. 
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yright law. In view of the questionable logic employed in the 
Rohauer opinion, and in view of the fact that Rohauer is a de-
parture from the traditional view of derivative copyrights,·2 it 
seems unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would retreat from its po-
sition in Russell, even in a case involving facts closer to those in 
Rohauer. 
Had the Ninth Circuit accepted defendant's argument in 
Russell, the ability of licen~ors of existing derivative works to 
control the use of their underlying material on the expiration of 
derivative copyrights would have been placed in doubt. By de-
clining to permit a member of the public to make unfettered use 
of copyrighted underlying material, the Ninth Circuit properly 
avoided an unwarranted diminution of the right of copyright 
proprietors to control the dissemination of their work. 
Daniel C. Moyles* 
II. ANTI-MONOPOLY V. GENERAL MILLS FUN INC.: A 
SIMPLE APPROACH TO GENERICNESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Anti-Monopoly v. General Mills Fun, Inc.,! the Ninth 
Circuit clarified the standards which control the determination 
of whether a trademark has retained sufficient distinctiveness to 
entitle it to continued protection under the Trademark Act of 
1946 (the Lanham Act).2 
Th~ controversy in Anti-Monopoly centered around the 
trademark on the popular real estate trading game of Monopoly. 
Parker Brothers, a division of defendant, acquired all the rights 
to the game, including patent thereon, in 1935, and registered 
MONOPOLY as a trademark in 1935 and 1936. The patent ex-
42. See text accompanying supra notes 36-37. 
* J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 1980. 
1. 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Sneed, J., and Blumenfield, D. J., sitting by designation). 
2. Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act) §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as the Lanham Act]. 
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pired in 1952, and the defendant subsequently relied on its 
trademark to protect its interests in the g~e. 
Plaintiff created a game designed to extol the virtues of the 
competitive enterprisE~ system, which he marketed under the ti-
tle Anti-Monopoly. III 1973, plaintiff sought to register ANTI-
MONOPOLY as a trademark, but the Trademark Office refused 
registration of the mark on the ground that it was confusingly 
and deceptively similar to defendant's MONOPOLY trademark. 
Plaintiff then sought declaratory relief in the district court, 
contending that the Monopoly mark was invalid because it had 
become the generic term for the game or, in the alternative, that 
if the mark were valid, plaintiff's use of the title "Anti-Monop-
oly" did not infringe on defendant's rights in the MONOPOLY 
mark.3 Defendant counterclaimed, alleging infringement, and 
sought injunctive relief. 
The district court held that MONOPOLY was not a generic 
term and awarded injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the district court had improperly tested for generic-
ness, and remanded the case for a reconsideration of the validity 
of the MONOPOLY trademark. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Functions of a Trademark 
The primary ob}ectives of trademark law are twofold:' First, 
by conferring on a manufacturer the exclusive right to use a 
3. 195 U.S.P.Q. 634 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Plaintiff also asserted claims under state un-
fair competition law, argued that defendant should be denied injunctive relief under the 
doctrine of "unclean hands," and that plaintiff should be entitled to a jury trial. These 
contentions are beyond the scope of this Note, and will not be considered further. 
4. In its report to Congress on the Lanham Act, supra note 2, the Senate Committee 
on Patents stated: 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. 
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it 
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and 
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has 
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the 
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappro-
priation by pirates and cheats. 
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONGo SERVICE 
1274. 
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trademark, trademark la.w seeks to facilitate the efforts of con-
sumers to identify and distinguish the particular products they 
desire. In this capacity, a trademark may function both as an 
indication of the source of a product and as an assurance that 
the product was manufactured in accordance with a particular 
standard of quality which a prospective purchaser may associate 
with the mark from previous experience;s Second, a trademark is 
an important medium through which a manufacturer can adver-
tise its products and develop good will without fear of misappro-
priation by its competitors.6 
The efficacy with which a trademark performs these func-
tions is directly dependent on the power of its proprietor to pre-
vent use of the same or similar marks by others. To the extent 
that the right to use a mark is exclusive, the ease with which 
consumers can distinguish a product is enhanced and, correla-
tively, the effectiveness of a producer'S advertising is increased. 
Conversely, if the power to restrict use of a mark is curtailed, 
the potential for consumer confusion and the dilution of the pro-
ducer's good will is increased. An absolute power to monopolize 
terminology, however, would be an open invitation to abuse. 
Manufacturers would be free to deplete the language available 
to describe a product, causing a corresponding impairment of 
the marketing efforts of their competitors. 
The Genericness Doctrine 
The genericness doctrine is the result of judicial efforts to 
establish limits on terminology which can be properly appropri-
ated to use as a trademark.'1 A generic term is the common name 
5. Before the early twentieth century, when producers and purchasers were likely to 
be in close physical proximity, it was generally thought that the primary function of a 
trademark was to identify the actual origin of a product. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling 
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The primary and proper function of a trade-
mark is to identify the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed."). How-
ever, with the explosion of population, industry, and transportation, it became increas-
ingly likely that consumers were totally unaware and unconcerned with the identify of 
the proprietor of a particular trademark. Gradually the courts began to recognize that 
many consumers rely on a tr~demark primarily as an assurance of a satisfactory level of 
quality, rather than as an indication of origin. For a full discussion of the trademark as a 
symbol of quality, see 1 J. GILSON, ThAnEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[1] 
(1979); 1 J. MCCARTHY, ThAnEldARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:3-4 (1973). 
6. E.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 
(1942). 
7. Generic terms comprise one element of a spectrum of classification which the 
13
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for an article or class of articles. It is typically a noun, and is a 
proper response to the question, "What is it?"8 It can be a name 
long recognized as fOl~ming a part of the English language, and 
regularly found in dictionaries. It may also be a term coined for 
use with a particular article or product but which, as a result of 
such use, has become identified in the minds of the consuming 
public as the name of that article.9 In contrast, a species, for 
purposes of trademark law, is a member of a genus or class de-
fined by a generic term.10 IVORY, for example, is a species of 
the genus soap. 
A generic term is poorly suited to function as an indication 
of source or quality. It is the common denominator of all the 
products within the genus which it defines, and is likely to be 
employed without regard to a particular product or producer. In 
the words of one commentator, a generic term is the "antithesis 
of a [trade]mark."ll 'The policies in support of free competition 
and against the monopolization of common terminology are 
strongly implicated when trademark protection is sought for a 
generic term. A necessary consequence of conferring trademark 
status in such a case is to deprive competitors of the right to call 
a product by its name. If a product is commonly known by only 
one or a few names, the result may be to confer a monopoly on 
the product. Accordingly, once a term is characterized as ge-
neric, its entitlement to trademark protection is terminated. It 
becomes a part of the common English language and is free for 
use by anyone.12 
courts have evolved to evaluate the right of a term to recognition as a trademark, and 
the degree of protection to be accorded. This spectrum was summarized in Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., as follows: "The cases, and in some instances the 
Lanham Act, identify four different categories of terms with respect to trademark pro-
tection. Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trade-
mark status and the degree of protection accorded, these cases are (1) generic, (2) de-
scriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful." 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
8. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-8. 
9. For examples of marks suffering this fate, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 
12:3. 
10. See Surgicenters of Am., Inc., v. Medical Dental Surgeons Co., 601 F.2d 1011 
(9th Cir. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
11. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at 405. 
12. E.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ("shredded 
wheat"); S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, Inc., 598 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1979) 
("mart"); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 
1975); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) 
14
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The Lanham Act and Generic Marks 
Although it does not employ the phrase "generic term," the 
Lanham Act contains several provisions calculated to deny 
trademark protection to terms which are primarily generic. Sec-
tion 2(e)18 provides that a mark "when applied to the goods of 
the applicant is merely description or deceptively misdiscriptive 
of them" shall be refused registration as a trademark. Section 
2(e) does not absolutely prevent registration of descriptive 
marks, however. Under section 2(f)14 and at common law, a 
mark which was at the onset of its use merely descriptive can 
become entitled to trademark status if it aquires a secondary 
meaning. 111 That is, if as a result of extensive use and advertise-
ment the proprietor of a descriptive mark succeeds in developing 
an association in the minds of the consuming public between the 
mark and its source, the mark is no longer merely descriptive. 
Rather, it has become distinctive of the producer's goods, and 
trademark protection will be awarded. 
Literally construed, sections 2(e) and 2(f) arguably support 
the view that a generic term should be entitled to registration if 
a sufficient showing of secondary meaning is made, as these sec-
tions do not expressly prohibit the registration of generic terms. 
However, the Trademark Office routinely denies registration to 
generic marks principally on the ground that they are "descrip-
tive" within the meaning of section 2(e).16 And, although the 
matter is not absolutely free from doubt,17 the growing majority 
("thermos"); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936) ("cellophane"); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("aspirin"). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e} (1976). 
14. [d. § 1052(f). 
15. For a more complete discussion of secondary meaning, see 1 J. GILSON, supra 
note 5, at § 2.09; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 15:1-15:1-9. 
16. For a discussion of federal regulation of generic terms, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra 
note 5, at § 12:18. 
17. Several cases have suggested in dicta that a generic term should be entitled to 
registration on a sufficient showing of secondary meaning. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-
Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); American Heritage 
Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 656 (5tI1 Cir. 1974); W. E. Bassett Co. v. 
Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970); AmeriC!Ul Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Laborato-
ries, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7tI1 Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 
(1970); Southwestern Bell TeL Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory Servo Inc., 371 
F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Hereaus Englehard Vacuum, Inc., 
267 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 396 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939 
{1968}. 
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of courts have taken the position that a generic mark is never 
subject to registration, regardless of any evidence of secondary 
meaning. IS These cow:ts have adopted the view that the objec-
tives of free competition outweigh those of trademark law when 
a generic mark is in issue. 
Sections 1419 and 1520 of the Lanham Act focus on the prob-
lem of a mark which, although at the inception of its use was 
distinctive, has become generic through association with a par-
ticular product. Section 14 provides cancellation of a registration 
of a mark "at any time if the registered mark becomes the com-
mon descriptive name of an article or substance. ..." Section 
15 provides that when a mark has been used in commerce for 
five consecutive years, the right to use the mark becomes incon-
testable, but also coutains the proviso that "no incontestable 
right shall be acquired in a mark which is the common descrip-
tive name of an article or substance." The courts have treated 
"common descriptive name" as equivalent to the phrase "generic 
term."21 
The Standard for Genericness 
The central issue in a genericness case is whether the con-
18. Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) ("larvacide" not ge-
neric); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeons Co., 601 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 
1979) ("surgicenters" generic); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) ("safari" generic in some contexts but not in others); CES Publish-
ing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Consumer Electron-
ics" generic); Leon Finker, Inc. v. Schlussell, 469 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("trillion" 
used with triangular shaped diamonds generic); Trak, Inc. v. Brenner Ski Kg, 475 F. 
Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1979); In re Soccer Sport Supply Co., Inc., 507 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 
1975); Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Per-
formed Time Prod. Co., 323 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons 
Ammonia Co., 299 F.2d 855 (C.C.P.A. 1962) ("sudsy" for detergent generic); Weiss Noo-
dle Co. v. Golden Cracker & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("ha-Iush-ka" 
generic when applied to egg noodle products). 
Evjdence of secondary meaning is always relevant to determine whether a mark is 
generic in the first place, In re Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1969), 
but under the rule followed in these cases, once the stigma of genericness attaches, even 
a substantial proof of secondary meaning may not entitle it to trademark status. 
It may be that, in many cases, the two positions will not produce different results. 
That is, in courts which would permit registration of a generic term on a showing of 
secondary meaning, the requisite showing is likely to be such that courts taking the con-
trary view would conclude that the mark is not generic. 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976). 
20. Id. § 1065. 
21. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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sumers in the relevant market place view a mark primarily as 
the name of the article in connection with which the mark is 
used.22 That is, whether the mark symbolizes the source or qual-
ity of a product, or is simply the name of the product itself. In 
the former instance, it functions as a trademark; in the latter, it 
is a generic term. The analysis of genericness thus necessarily 
involves ascertaining how the marlf is perceived by consumers. 
In making this evaluation the court may rely on a variety of 
types of evidence including, for example, consumer testimony, 
consumer surveys, and dictionaries.sa That some consumers may 
use a mark as the name of an article, however, does not compel a 
finding of genericness. To properly be characterized as generic, 
the principal significance of a mark, that is, its meaning to a 
majority of the product's consumers, must be to denote the 
name of a product rather than its source.24 
Original and Acquired Distinctiveness 
Courts typically assert the standard for genericness as an 
abstract principal of trademark law to be applied uniformly in 
all genericness cases. In practice, however, the courts distinguish 
between marks which were descriptive or generic at the onset of 
their use, and marks which were originally distinctive, but which 
the public may have adopted as a generic term. In the former 
instance, the user is seeking registration or protection of a mark 
which would otherwise comprise a part of the common vocabu-
lary on the theory that the mark has acquired a secondary 
meaning. In this case, it is the proprietor of a mark who has the 
burden of proving that the mark is neither generic nor merely 
descriptive,215 and the greater the degree of descriptiveness or 
22. A frequently quoted test for genericness was offered by Judge Learned Hand in 
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921): "The single question, as I 
view it, in all these cases, is merely one of fact: What do buyers understand by the word 
for whose use the parties are contending?" 
23. For a full discussion of the types of evidence on which the courts rely to evaluate 
genericness, see 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, at § 2.02[2]. 
24. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 
Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida 
Int'I, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Sm Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & 
Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
25. Keller Prods., Inc. v. Rubber Linings Corp., 213 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954); Jean 
Patov, Inc. v. Jacqueline Chochron, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), all'd, 312 
F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Meyer & Wenthe, Inc., 267 F.2d 945 (C.C.P.A. 1959); In re 
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genericness, the heavi,er this burden is likely to be.28 In some 
instances, a mark may be so inherently descriptive or generic 
that registration or protection will be denied, regardless of the 
evidence of secondary meaning.27 
On the other hand, if a mark had primary distinctiveness, 
that is, the mark was arbitrary or fanciful at the onset of its use, 
but has become generic as a result of public association between 
the name of the product and the mark, the courts apply the test 
for genericness with llIluch less vigor. In such a case, the party 
alleging genericness must produce the evidence.28 Doubts are re-
solved in favor of the trademark proprietor,29 and if the mark 
has a mixed significan,ce, evidence which might otherwise be dis-
regarded as proof of secondary meaning is weighed in determin-
ing whether trademark protection shall continue.so 
Hollywood Brands, Inc., 214 F.2d 139 (C.C.P.A. 1954); see Kellogg Co. v. National Bis-
cuit Co., 305 U.S. III (1938). 
26. In re Meyer & Wentbe, Inc., 267 F.2d 945 (C.C.P.A. 1959). 
27. For cases holding ths.t once a mark is characterized as generic, no amount of 
evidence of secondary meaning will entitle it to registration or protection, see note 18 
supra. 
28. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.' Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 
(D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. 'King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). 
29. American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 
1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d 
Cir.1963). 
30. See Abercrombie & li'itch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 
1976). Addressing the issue of genericness, the court stated that: 
[t]he pervasiveness of the principle [tha~ a generic term 
should never be entitled to trademark protection regardless of 
evidence of secondary meaning] is well illustrated by a series 
of well-known cases holding that when a suggestive or fanciful 
term has become generic. • • trademark protection will be de-
nied save for those markets where the term still has not be-
come generic and a secondary meaning has been shown to 
continue. 
Professor McCarthy, arguing that once a mark has been found to be generic, evi-
dence of secondary meaning is irrelevant, stated: 
Once determined to be generic, any proof of secondary mean-
ing seems contradictory to the very concept of "generic." That 
is, if buyers think the word is the name of the product, how 
would there be secondary meaning in the sense that buyers 
associate the nsme with only one source? There are several 
possibilities: 
(1) Where there is only one source for a particular genus of 
goods over a peliod of time, the public might come to associ-
ate that one source with the generic name of the goods. But 
18
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In a few cases, courts have required that the party alleging 
genericness do more than preponderate, and insist that there be 
a conclusive showing of genericness,81 or a showing that the 
mark has lost all significance as a trademark.32 Even if the mark 
is determined to be generic, it does not follow that all trademark 
protection is lost. Where a mark still retains trademark signifi-
cance to an appreciable percentage of consumers, the court may 
be willing to fashion a decree requiring the defendant to take 
extra measures in connection with the use of the mark to ensure 
that its goods are not confused with the plaintiff's.83 If a mark 
continues to function as a trademark to an identifiable segment 
of the marketplace, some courts have been willing to continue 
the trademark status of the mark in that particular market." 
this is not evidence of trademark usage, and is referred to as 
mere "de facto secondary meaning." 
(2) Some buyers may think the term is generic, while others 
think it is a trademark. In such a case, the term is generic to 
some buyers and a trademark to others. 
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at 432 (citations omitted). 
This writer believes there is a third possibility which Professor McCarthy has not 
presented. In many instances, a consumer's perception of a mark will not be clearly de-
fined, and the mark will have a mixed significance. That is, a consumer may use a mark 
generically for reasons of convenience, but may also recognize that the mark is the brand 
of a particular producer. In this case, the relevant group of buyers consists of those who 
think the mark is generic, those to whom the mark has a mixed connotation, and those 
who view the mark as a trademark. An excellent illustration of this situation was 
presented in E. I. DePont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, 393 F. Supp. 502 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). In that case, Yoshida argued that DuPont's trademark TEFLON had 
become generic. Yoshida offered a consumer survey in which approximately 86% of con-
sumers who, when asked for the name of pots and pans covered with a non-stick coating, 
responded with TEFLON or TEFLON ll. DuPont countered with a survey of its own m 
which consumers were asked whether they recognized TEFLON as a brand name. Ap-
proximately 68% of the consumers surveyed responded that they did, and the court con-
cluded that TEFLON was not generic. 
By resolving doubts in favor of a trademark proprietor in such a case, evidence of a 
mixed significance, which might otherwise be characterized as proving only a secondary 
association, would instead support a finding that a mark is not generic. • 
31. Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 205 (N.D. Ga. 1967). 
For an analysis of how the genericness doctrine may penalize the effective promoter, and 
an argument that a finding of genericness should result only after conclusive evidence 
thereof, see 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, 'I'RAnEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES § 74.2 (3d ed. 1969). 
32. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270, aff'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957). 
33. King-Seeley Thermos Co., v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
34. Bayer Co. v. United Drug. Co., 272 F. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
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C. THE NINTH CmCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
The district court ruled that MONOPOLY could not be 
deemed generic unlesB it was found to refer "to all real estate 
trading board games and not to an individual game emanating 
from a single source."35 Having thus formulated the controlling 
genus, the district court concluded that the public did not use 
MONOPOLY in a generic sense, but used it to refer to a "partic-
ular and very popular board game produced by a single com-
pany,"36 and that the mark was therefore valid. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this construction of the generic-
ness issue. The crucial determination, the court stated, was 
whether "consumers use the term MONOPOLY primarily to de-
note the product, or illstead to denote its producer."3'1 The court 
of appeals held that the district court failed to address this 
question by tying the alternative findings together in its 
conclusion. 
The Ninth Circuit prefaced its analysis of genericness with 
a review of the fundamental objectives of patent law, and its re-
lationship to trademark law. Patent law, the court noted, was 
designed to encourage the development of new technology by 
granting limited monopolies, but is a narrow exception to the 
general principle of free competition in intellectual property. 
Trademarks, the court continued, are not properly used to ex-
tend patent monopolies. The genericness doctrine "is designed 
to prevent such anti-competitive misuse of trademarks."38 
To illustrate the proper application of the genericness doc-
trine, the Ninth Circuit developed a hypothetical example based 
on the variation of the game of chess manufactured by Chessco, 
and marketed under the trademark EN PASSANT.39 It may be, 
the ~ourt postulated, that a consumer desires EN PASSANT for . 
reasons which are "source particular,"40 for example, price, style, 
35. 611 F.2d 296 at 305. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 301. 
39. [d. at 303. EN PASSANT is not a hypothetical game, but is actually produced 
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or quality. In such a case a consumer uses EN PASSANT as a 
trademark, to identify and distinguish a particular species of the 
game of chess, produced by Chessco. On the other hand, it may 
be that a consumer desires EN PASSANT for reasons which are 
"source-irrelevant,"U that is, because the game is played by dif-
ferent rules than the common version of chess. In this instance, 
a consumer uses EN P ASSANT generically, to identify a partic-
ular game rather than a species of a game and 
[w]here before there was only one relevant prod-
uct category or genus, chess, there are now two: 
chess and EN PASSANT. If Chessco wants to 
monopolize this product category, it may do so 
through a patent, but not through a trademark. 
In trademark genericness parlance, EN P AS-
SANT has evolved from a species to a genus.42 
In the same fashion, the Ninth Circuit recommended that 
consumers may use MONOPOLY generically, without under-
standing the term to refer to all real estate trading games. That 
is, "if consumers think of MONOPOLY as a unique game, and 
differentiate it from all ather real estate trading games by 
source-relevant characteristics, e.g., length of time it takes to 
play, or strategy involved, MONOPOLY may constitute its awn 
genus."48 
The district court's error resulted from attempting to ana-
lyze genericness by first defining a genus, and then determining 
whether the genus and MONOPOLY were equivalent. Once the 
judge improperly defined the genus, he never confronted the 
possibility that MONOPOLY itself might constitute a genus. To 
avoid this error, the district court should have foregone the defi-
nition of a genus altogether. "The proper mode of analysis is to 
decide but one question: whether the primary significance of a 
term is to denote product, or source. In making this determina~ 
tion, the correct genus-species distinction, that is, the correct 
genericness finding, follows automatically."" 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding of the 
district court, and remanded the case for a reconsideration of 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 305. 
44. [d. at 306. 
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whether MONOPOLY is a generic term. 
D. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit properly declined to adopt the district 
court's analysis of genericness. The test proposed by the district 
court, that is, whether MONOPOLY referred to all real estate 
trading board games or to a single game produced by a particu-
lar company, was overly broad. Under this approach, MONOP-
OL Y might be found entitled to continued recognition as a 
trademark even if it were generally perceived as a purely generic 
term. MONOPOLY need not encompass all real estate games to 
become generic; as the Ninth Circuit noted, it is possible for 
MONOPOLY itself to become a genus. 
The difficulty inherent in attempting to analyze genericness 
by first defining a genus is clearly revealed in the district court's 
opinion. The issue of genericness arises in an enormous variety 
of circumstances.411 It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate 
standards by which a genus can be consistently and fairly de-
fined. Rather, a genus will expand or contract according to the 
perceptions of the particular judge or jury and the facts of each 
case. Moreover, the district court's approach would tend to ob-
scure rather than darify the crucial issue in a genericness 
case-the significance of a mark to consumers. A mark is not 
generic because it is possible to theorize a genus to which it ap-
plies; a mark can be generic only if the consumers of the product 
perceive it as such. Only then are the policies of trademark law 
and free competition implicated. 
The test proposed by the Ninth Circuit at the conclusion of 
its analysis of genericness avoids these pitfalls by stating the cri-
teria for genericness directly in terms of the central issue: does 
the consuming public understand the mark as referring to the 
product itself, or as a symbol of source or quality? In answering 
this question, "the correct genus-species distinction, that is, the 
correct genericness finding, follows automatically."48 
This approach to the question of genericness has much to 
45. For an illustrative list of uses considering genericness, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra 
note 5, at § 12:3-4. 
46. 611 F.2d at 306. 
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recommend it. It avoids the need to define a genus, and thus 
avoids involving the court in the tangential problem of deter-
mining the criteria by which such a definition should be formu-
lated. It has the potential of being applied with a high degree of 
fairness and consistency-' the court need only consider the dis-
puted mark in the context of each product to which it is affixed, 
and ask whether it is primarily understood as the common name 
of that product. It also closely parallels the "common descriptive 
name" terminology used in the Lanham Act, and is thus most 
likely to produce results which are consistent with the objectives 
of the statute.47 
Although the Anti-Monopoly panel is to be commended for 
its straightforward approach to the issue of genericness, the 
opinion contains dicta which suggest that a finding of generic-
ness should result in circumstances where it may be unwar-
ranted. In its discussion of EN P ASSANT, the court noted that 
a consumer may request EN PASSANT not because it is pro-
duced by Chessco, but because the game itself possesses unique 
features or qualities which distinguish it from other versions of 
chess. In such a case, a consumer no longer recognizes EN PAS-
SANT as a symbol of source or quality, but uses it generically 
and, in the words of the court, "EN PASSANT has evolved from 
a species to a genus."48 
The difficulty with this'reasoning is that it may create in-
surmountable obstacles for the producers of new or unique prod-
ucts who seek trademark protection, particularly when the com-
mon vernacular does not contain convenient terminology with 
which consumers can describe or identify the product. A con-
sumer's natural inclination when confronted 'with a new or un-
usual product, is to adopt the producer's trademark as the name 
of the product. The consumer requires a word to identify the 
article which the English language may not supply, and the 
trademark becomes a convenient solution. Moreover, a consumer 
in these circumstances will not rely on a mark to perform the 
usual function of a trademark-to facilitate product selec-
tion-simply because the product has no competition. The 
source of the product becomes a secondary consideration, and 
47. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
48. 611 F.2d at 303. 
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consumers will make their purchasing decisions primarily on the 
basis of whether the product satisfies a particular need. It is only 
when a consumer encounters competing versions of the same 
product that the significance of a mark as a trademark is likely 
to become paramount. 
It is thus likely that a mark used in connection with a new 
or unique product begins to degenerate into a generic term at 
the instant of its presentation to the public, regardless of how 
fanciful or arbitrary it may be. It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that the public's interest in continuing trademark pro-
tection for such a mark is thereby extinguished. In many in-
stances, especially while a mark is relatively new to the public, it 
will assume a dual significance, functioning both generically and 
as a symbol of source or quality.'''' While only one source exists 
for a product, consumers may use the mark affixed thereto ge-
nerically simply for reasons of convenience, but may also con-
tinue to recognize that the mark signifies that the product ema-
nated from a particular source. As long as this secondary 
association persists, a mark has the potential of functioning pri-
marily as a trademark, should a competitor enter the field. 
Nor does it necessarily follow that when trademark protec-
tion is conferred on a mark which is used generically, the propri-
etor thereof acquires. a monopoly in the product to which the 
mark is affixed. Trademark protection does not, in and of itself, 
create a monopoly; Blbsent patent protection, competing manu-
facturers are at all times free to create their own versions of a 
product, and enter the market with their own trademark. The 
extent to which continued protection of an allegedly generic 
mark will frustrate competition is a function of the public per-
ception of the mark. As long as a mark retains secondary signifi-
cance to a substantiBll percentage of consumers, competitors will 
be able to enter the market with minimal difficulty. Market en-
try is likely to be impossible or commercially impractical only in 
cases in which consumers perceive a mark as a purely generic 
term. 
A finding of geIlericness in these circumstances may do as 
much to impede as to promote free enterprise. Manufacturers 
49. See note 30 supra. 
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contemplating the introduction of a product may elect to assert 
a defense of genericness not because an allegedly generic mark 
prevents their entry into a market, but because substantial re-
ductions in advertising costs may be realized by appropriating 
the good will of their competitor. It may be that a wealth of 
alternative symbols and terminology were available to an imita-
tor to serve as a trademark. A finding of genericness in these 
circumstances will necessarily reduce the return on investment 
to which the creator of a mark would ordinarily be entitled.lio 
And the imitator will be rewarded for its efforts with a competi-
tive advantage, as it will be able to offer its product at a lower 
price. A court should be reluctant to find a mark which was orig-
inally distinctive generic, as the ultimate effects of such a find-
ing will be the promotion of ill will among manufacturers, and 
the discouragement of vigorous product development and 
advertisement. iiI 
Accordingly, when a mark under consideration was orIgI-
nally fanciful or arbitrary, and particularly when it has been 
used in connection with a new or unique product, the courts 
should evaluate genericness with an eye to preserving trademark 
status. The party asserting genericness should bear the burden 
of proof, and doubts should be resolved in favor of the trade-
50. In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the Supreme Court stated that it was not 
unfair to compel National to share the good will in the term "shredded wheat," devel-
oped at substantial expense and effort, because "[s]haring in the goodwill of all article 
unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in 
the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested." 305 U.S. 111, 122 
(1938). 
While the conclusion that a mark is generic may be justified on public policy 
grounds, this writer believes that it can also be extremely unfair to the proprietor of the 
mark, as the effect can be to compel a manufacturer to subsidize the efforts of its com-
petitors. See 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 31, at § 74.2. 
51. In determining that commercial speech is protected by the first amendinent, the 
Supreme Court has recently recognized the strong public interest in advertising. In Vir-
ginia State Bd. of PharmacY v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
765 (1976), Justice Blackmun stated: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is nontheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at 
what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure 
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It 
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre-
gate, be intelligent and well-informed. 
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mark proprietor.1I2 The courts should consider evidence of secon-
dary meaning, recogni:~ing that a generic usage may simply be a 
matter of convenience. In this context, the test for genericness 
should require that a majority of consumers no longer recognizes 
a mark as the brand of a particular producer, and not merely 
that a majority of consumers uses a mark generically.1I8 
Another fault with the Anti-Monopoly opinion lies in its 
discussion of the relationship between patent and trademark 
law. In asserting that trademarks are not properly used as pat-
ent substitutes, the court both confused the analysis of generic-
ness, and appears to have invited a more rigorous scrutiny of 
marks which have been used in connection with patented prod-
ucts.M Although it is true that trademarks are not properly used 
to extend patent monopolies, the presence or absence of patent 
protection is merely a coincidental factor in the determination of 
genericness.1I11 While it may be that the likelihood of a mark's 
becoming generic during the period of a patent monopoly is in-
creased, it is entirely possible that patent production had no ef-
fect whatsoever on the public perception of the mark. In analyz-
ing genericness, a court would ask only whether consumers have 
adopted a mark as the name of a product-a question which can 
be answered without reference to patent law. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In holding that the issue of genericness can be resolved by 
simply asking whethor a mark denotes a product or its source, 
the Ninth Circuit off.ered a simple, straightforward approach to 
52. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text. 
53. See note 30 supra. 
54. In its discussion of patent law, the Ninth Circuit cited Singer Mfg. Co. v. June 
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). In that case, the Court held that the mark SINGER 
passed into the public domain upon the expiration of related sewiIig machine patents. A 
number of subsequent cases construed Singer to mean that a trademark used in connec-
tion with a patented product expires with the patent. Contemporary authorities, how-
ever, reject any such rule, and the fact that a product was patented does not raise any 
presumption of genericness. For a complete discussion of the history of the Singer doc-
trine, see 1 J. GasoN, supra note 5, at § 2.02[3]. 
Although the Ninth Circuit cited Singer only for the proposition that when a patent 
expires the invention which the patent protected enters the public domain, by approving 
of Singer in the context of e genericness case, the Ninth Circuit opinion is at least sus-
ceptible of being interpreted as taking a restrictive view of trademarks which have been 
used on patented products. 
55. See 1 J. GasoN, supra note 5, at § 2.02[3]. 
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the problem of the validity of a trademark. Under this approach, 
a court will avoid the difficult task of defining a genus, and is 
. more likely to reach a result which is fair to both a trademark 
proprietor and the consuming public. But the courts should ap-
ply the test with particular caution when an originally distinc-
tive mark is in issue, recognizing that such a mark may have 
utility as a trademark despite an apparent generic usage. 
Daniel C. Moyles* 
III. THE VALIDITY OF THE CALIFORNIA DROIT DE 
SUITE UNDER PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES 
A. FACTS 
In Morseburg v. Balyon1 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Copyright Act of 1909 does not preempt the California Resale 
Royalties Act (Royalties Act)/~ The case arose when plaintiff, an . 
art dealer, in separate transactions sold two paintings under cir-
cumstances which brought him within the provisions of the 
newly enacted Royalties Act. 
The Royalties Act requires a seller of fine art (paintings, 
sculpture and drawings), if the seller resides in California or if 
the sale takes place within the state, to pay five per cent of the 
proceeds of the sale to the artist. The royalty applies to all such 
sales except for initial sales by the artist,8 resales after the death 
of the artist: resales of less than $1000,1) or when the selling 
price is less than the seller's purchase price.6 The Royalties Act 
places the burden on the seller to locate and pay the artist 
within 90 days, or to pay the royalty to the Arts Council, which 
* J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law 1980. 
1. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. June 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Schroeder and Alarcon, J.J.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3343-44 (Nov. 11, 1980). 
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West) which became operative on January 1, 1977. 
3. ld. § 986(b)(1). 
4. ld. § 986(b)(3). 
5. ld. § 986(b)(2). 
6. ld. § 986(b)(4). 
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will attempt to find the artist.'1 
The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Royal-
ties Act on the theories that: (1) it was preempted by the Copy-
right Act of 1909 in effect at the time of the sales; (2) its provi-
sions unduly impaired the right to contract given in the 
contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution; and (3) it deprived 
plaintiff of a fundamental property right without due process. 
The district court rejected all of plaintiff's claims,S and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 1909 Act did not pre-
empt the state Royalties Act. 
B. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL SgTTING 
Preemption 
Under constitutional authority to regulate copyright,S Con-
gress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909, in controversy here, 
which provides that, "[a]ny person entitled thereto, upon com-
plying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive 
right: (a) To print, reprint, copy, and vend the copyrighted 
work; ... "IO Nevertheless, Congress never purported to main-
tain exclusive jurisdiction over copyright. The Supreme Court 
early noted that the Constitution did not take away an author's 
common law property right in an unpublished work.l1 In Whea-
ton v. Peters, the Court first articulated the boundaries of the 
states' concurrent copyright powers, which are reached when the 
state law "actually conflicts with the exercise of the powers of 
Congress. "12 
Since that time the courts have grappled with the issue of 
the extent of the states' powers in copyright, especially in those 
7. Id. § 986(a)(2), (5). Other portions of the Resale Royalties Act provide an artists's 
right of action against the seller for three years after sale or one year after discovery of 
sale, and a claim against the Arts Council for seven years if the seller paid the Council. 
The artist's right to receive the royalty is neither transferrable nor waivable. The royalty 
retained by the seller is exempt from attachment or judgment by the seller's creditors. 
8. 201 U.S.P.Q. 518, 520 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
9. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8 gives Congress the power, "To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
10. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (19'TO). 
11. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,597-98 (1834). 
12. Id. 
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areas which touch the federal statutes. The Supreme Court has 
discussed the issue generally in cases dealing with other federal 
powers, such as the right to regulate interstate commerce,I3 the 
registration of aliens/4 and the regulation of the practice of 
law.IG 
The Court has been reluctant to deny out of hand the 
states' regulatory power. Rather, the Court has stated that in a 
variety of areas in which the federal government and the states 
have concurrent power, state law is preempted only when it 
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."IB More fundamen-
tally, the Court will differentiate between the nature of the 
power in question and the subjects of the power the state is try-
ing to affect to determine whether the state is precluded from 
acting. In other words, the Court has admonished the lower 
courts not to look merely at the nature of a power to decide 
whether the states may enter that regulatory field, but rather to 
look at the subjects the states are attempting to control. If the 
subject is national in scope, one that "admit[s] only of one uni-
form system, or plan of reguiation,"l'1 for example railroad safety 
or the standards for granting a patent on an, invention, then 
those subjects fall within the exclusive legislative power of Con-
gress. On the other hand, if the subjects of a power are not of 
such national importance or if a state has an interest in regulat-
ing a subject peculiarly important to its citizens, then the state 
may validly exercise the "national" power. 
The Court used this rationale in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Sti/fe1l8 and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc. I9 which 
13. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding state law 
regulating certain pilotage fees because, inter alia, it did not interfere with the federal 
power to regulate interstate commerce even though Congress had enacted other pilotage 
fee regulations). 
14. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (invalidation of state law requiring re-
gistration of aliens in addition to federal registration). 
15. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) (denial of state's request for an in-
junction to prevent a non-lawyer from practicing before the U.S. Patent Office, noting 
that the law of a state, though enacted in the exercise of an uncontroverted power, must 
yield when incompatible with federal legislation). 
16. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) •. 
17. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
18. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
19. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
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involved articles that were arguably patentable, upon which pat-
ents were held invalid. When an article capable of being pat-
ented or copyrighted is held to be unprotected by a patent or a 
copyright, state law cannot forbid others to copy the article.20 To 
forbid copying would interfere with the federal scheme of patent 
and copyright laws which allow free access to copy whatever the 
federal laws purposely leave in the public domain.21 Thus, state 
unfair competiton laws could not protect inherently patentable 
items which did not meet the requirements for patent. 
The Ninth Circuit in Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.n 
similarly defined the scope of permissible state intrusion into 
the copyright field. State law interferes with federal policy when 
the state creates a new protectable interest beyond what the 
copyright laws confer. 28 
In Goldstein v. California,24 the Supreme Court did not find 
this interference with federal policy in the California laws which 
made record piracy a criminal act. When the state law deals with 
a subject matter inherently not copyrightable and "of purely lo-
cal importance and not worthy of national attention or protec-
tion,"25 as were sound recordings prior to 1972, then that state 
law does not conflict with federal regulation,26 and is therefore 
not preempted. 
California Resale Royalties Act 
The United States has not provided any more benefit to the 
fine artist than it has to other originators of "writings." Congress 
declined to include a droit de suite (literally, "follow-up right" 
or, as it has come to be translated, "art proceeds right") provi-
sion in or along with the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. Thus, 
20. Id. at 237. 
21. Id. 
22. 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964). 
23. Id. at 351. 
24. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
25. Id. at 558. A 1972 amendment to the federal copyright laws provided protection 
to sound recordings for a specific period of time, presumably contemplating protection 
until the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 would take effect. Id. at 552. 
26. Even though sound recordings were not inherently copyrightable at that time, 
the Court found them to be within the meaning of "writings" in the Constitution; thus, 
"Congress was empowered to legislate regarding [sound recordings] and could preempt 
the area if it chose to do so." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974). 
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California added Civil Code section 986, the Resale Royalties 
Act,2'1 to its laws in 1977 to give its artists the benefit of a con-
tinued financial interest in their works. 
The right of an artist to participate in the increased value of 
her or his work as it is sold and resold on the market first 
originated about 1920 in France in response to the romanticism 
imposed upon the Impressionist painters.28 Several European 
countries added droit de suite provisions to their copyright laws 
soon afterward. The California Resale Royalties Act is patterned 
after this legislation. 
The need for droit de suite legislation arose because of the 
nature of works of fine art as opposed to the nature of other 
works of authorship. An author of a written work receives a roy-
alty with each copy sold, whereas a painter or sculptor has no 
such benefit. The sale of a painting, drawing or sculpture is a 
single, final event.29 
The nature of copyright protection is that copies of works 
may be made only with the authorization, and to the financial 
benefit, of the originator. The protection for the fine artist is 
considerably less valuable under copyright laws because the art-
ist does not financially benefit from the sale of copies of his or 
her work, but from the sale of the original itself. In other words, 
the exploitation of the creative works of writings and music is in 
the reproduction, while the first sale from painter or scullltor to 
another is the only exploitation the fine artist receives. Any 
more gains in the sale of the original is realized by the owner of 
the work, not by the artist. 
The rationale for providing compulsory royalties to fine art-
ists, therefore, "lies in the desire to secure for them a continuing 
financial interest in their work in a manner commensurate with 
27. See note 7 supra and accompanying text for provisions of the Royalties Act. 
28. For a more detailed history and criticism 'of droit de suite, see generally, 
Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged 
Artist under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1 (1962); Price, Govern-
ment Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE 
L.J. 1333 (1968); Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Pro-
posed Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. L. REv. 19 (1966-67). 
29. Price, note 28 supra, at 1343. 
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that conferred on other artists by our copyright laws. "30 It also 
lies in the concept that the fine artist continues to influence the 
value of each original work throughout his or her life, and that 
artist should reap some benefit from those efforts.31 
C. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
Preemption 
In a holding specifically confined to the Copyright Act of 
1909, the court stated that the Royalties Act afforded rights ad-
ditional to those created by the 1909 Act. The court analyzed 
the preemption issue in terms of the extent to which the 1909 
Act "occupied the field" a<ldressed by the Roy81ties Act and the 
"conflict" with the federal copyright law which plaintiff claimed 
the Royalties Act genel~ated. 31 
The court recogniz,ed the broad meaning given to each term. 
Depending upon the Supreme Court's choice of emphasis, occu-
pation, the court stated., "can require no more than the existence 
of a federal law generul1y applicable to a significant portion of 
the area in question to no less than an express statement dem-
onstrating an intention to occupy the area duly enacted by Con-
gress. "33 Similarly, conflict can have a wide range of meaning, 
from the mere possibillty of potential conflict between state and 
federal law, to an actwll, substantial thwarting of important fed-
eral purposes.3• 
The Ninth Circuit noted that in situations in which what it 
called "national power" is at stake, such areas as foreign affairs 
and labor relations, the courts will more likely find federal pre-
emption than in situations in which state powers such as con-
sumer protection are involved.85 
The court found that Goldstein v. California,36 in which the 
30. Remarks of Rep. Wannan, 124 CONGo REc. EI145, Mar. 8, 1978. 
31. Abel Ferry, originator of the droit de suite, cited in Hauser, The Problem of 
Protection for the Underprivileged Artist under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP COpy-
RIGHT L. SYMI'. 1, 41 (1962). 
32. 621 F.2d at 976. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. 621 F.2d at 976-77. 
36. 412 U.S. 546, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973). 
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Supreme court held that a California record piracy statute did 
not conflict with federal copyright law, governed this case. The 
challenged statute in Goldstein protected owners of master 
sound recordings from piracy at a time when sound recordings 
were not a category of "writings" embraced within federal copy-
right laws. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does 
not give Congress exclusive power over copyright and thus does 
not preclude the states from granting copyright protection to 
those subjects not covered by federal law. 57 
Congress had not set out requirements for the copyright-
ability of sound recordings at that time. No scheme existed to 
distinguish between those recordings qualifying .for copyright 
and those Congress desired to be left in the public domain. Be-
cause Congress had not entered the field and had not "drawn a 
balance"5s between competing interests of the states and the 
federal government in the area of sound recordings, the state 
statute could not conflict with federal law. 59 
Both the Supreme Court in Goldstein and the Morseburg 
panel found Sears"O and Compeo"1 unsupportive of the position 
that the respective state laws were preempted by federal copy-
right laws. At issue in Sears and Compeo were state laws which 
purported to prohibit, under unfair competition laws, the copy-
ing of mechanical configurations which, although inherently pat-
entable, fell short of the qualifications for the grant of a patent. 
Unlike the record piracy and Royalties Act, respectively, then, 
the state laws in Sears and Compeo actually conflicted with a 
federal scheme which afforded protection to qualified objects 
and specifically placed objects falling outside those qualifications 
in the public domain. "2 
37. Id. at 560. 
38. Id. at 569. 
39. Id. at 569-70. ("The application of state law in these cases to prevent the copy-
ing of articles which did not meet the requirements for federal protection disturbed the 
careful balance which Congress had drawn and thereby necessarily gave way under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. No comparable conflict between state and federal 
law arises in the case of recordings of musical performances. In regard to this category of 
'writings,' Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no 
reason exists why the state should not be free to act."). 
40. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
41. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
42. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70; see also Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 
F.2d 972, 978, which states the Ninth Circuit's concordance in this distinction of Sears 
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Rather, the Morseburg court analogized the resale royalty as 
an additional right given to a subject matter of copyright (works 
of fine art), similar to the state protection, validated in Gold-
stein, given to works inherently not copyrightable at the time 
(pre-1972 sound recordings)."a 
The Ninth Circuit also decided that neither the section of 
the 1909 Act giving the copyright owner the exclusive right "to 
vend""" nor the section giving the owner of a particular copy the 
unrestricted right to transfer that COpy"5 impliedly preempted 
the Royalties Act. Although the court recognized problems at-
tendant with any state droit de suite legislation, it did not ad-
dress potential issues, but rather limited its holding to the royal-
ties act in question. The California Royalties Act did not present 
problems of excessive royalties or multiple royalties imposed on 
a single transaction, problems which the court stated might af-
fect the outcome of another preemption argument. 
Contracts Clause and Due Process 
The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's other challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Royalties Act. "6 Plaintiff argued that the 
Royalties Act rewrote his contracts with the artists from whom 
he bought paintings. '!'he court admitted that in circumstances 
in which a buyer had purchased the art prior to passage of the 
Act, the Royalties Ad burdened the buyer of the work with an 
unbargained for obligation to pay a royalty upon the resale of 
the work. The court was not persuaded, however, that the bur-
d,en was significant."'1 
Relying on United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey"8 and 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,"s the court stated that 
a state law which insignificantly impairs a contract obligation 
needs only minor justification. Only when the impairment be-
and Compco. 
43. 621 F.2d at 977-
44. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (19'/0). 
45. Id. § 27. 
46. The contracts clause and due process issues will not be discussed in this paper 
other than in this brief description of the court's analysis of them. 
47. 621 F.2d at 979. 
48. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
49. 438 U.S. 234, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 886 (1978). 
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comes severe and irrevocable and serves little or no economic or 
social purpose does that law violate the contracts clause. 50 In 
United States Trust Co. the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional a statute repealing a covenant between the state and 
bondholders of the Port Authority. The Court required that 
when state .interference with private contracts was challenged, 
the courts should defer to legislative judgment as to the neces-
sity and reasonableness of a particular measure involving eco-
nomic and social regulation. 51 
The Spannaus court invalidated a portion of a pension ben-
efits statute that required companies closing offices or terminat-
ing pension plans to pay an extra pension charge if the money 
already in the pension fund was insufficient to pay qualified em-
ployees. The contracts clause imposes some limits on the power 
of the state to impair previous contract relationships in the exer-
cise of legitimate police power, but "the severity of the impair-
ment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation 
must clear."52 The obligation forced upon the plaintiff in Morse-
burg was not so severe as to topple the Royalties Act which 
served the legitimate state purpose of promoting artistic 
endeavors. 
Plaintiff's due process argument met with even less success. 
The Royalties Act, the court stated, did not deprive plaintiff of a 
fundamental property right. Furthermore, the court found the 
rational basis for the Royalties Act-the promotion of artistic 
endeavors-a proper function of the state. 53 Therefore, plaintiff 
did not meet his burden of showing the Royalties Act irrational 
or capricious. I>' 
Nor did the plaintiff's assertion that the retroactivity of the 
Royalties Act removed it from what is normally considered to be 
50 .. 621 F.2d at 979. 
51. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977). 
52. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 
886 (1978). 
53. 621 F.2d at 978. 
54. Id. at 979 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976), 
which stated, "It is by now well established that legislative acts adjusting the burdens 
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, 
and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that 
the legislature has acted in an arbitrary or irrational way."). 
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economic regulation convince the court that the Royalties Act 
violated plaintiff's right to due process. On the contrary, the 
court held that legislation is not unlawful merely because it up-
sets settled expectations. Such legislation would have to cause 
harsh and oppressive consequences, which the Ninth Circuit 
found the Royalties Act did not produce.1I11 
D. CRITIQUE 
Although the Supreme Court denied a review of the Morse-
burg opinion, it seems clear that the Ninth Circuit mistakenly 
held that Goldstein, a case dealing with state protection of 
works not copyrightable under federal law, governed Morseburg, 
a case in which the granting of rights to works specifically pro-
tected under copyright law was at issue. Rather, Goldstein 
should be interpreted to apply to those situations in which Con-
gress has stayed its hand and has not afforded protection to a 
particular type of writing. liS The challenge to the Royalties Act, 
however, was grounded on the contention that the state at-
tempted to exercise control over writings which Congress itself 
chose to protect. 
If the Royalties Act is applicable to works within the sub-
ject matter of the Copyright Act of 1909, then the next issue 
should be whether tho rights provided by the state law conflict 
with or obstruct the purposes of the federal law. Those rights in 
controversy are the ril~ht to vendll1 and the right of unrestricted 
transfer of a particulllll" copy of the work.lls 
The court ruled correctly that the Royalties Act does not 
impair the !ight to velld under the 1909 Act. Just as a state sales 
55. 621 F.2d at 980. 
56. Jacobs v. Robitaille, 4.06 F. Supp. ll45, ll53 (D.N.H. 1976). Jacobs was a misap-
propriation case in which the defendant, an ex-employee of plaintiff, started a free classi-
fied-ad newspaper strikingly similar in appearance to plaintiff's and using some of plain· 
tiff's ads. In determining the applicability of Goldstein, the standard for national 
interest as mentioned there Vias whether the writing is copyrightable under federal law. 
If so, then it is per se of national interest. And as long as the writings were copyright· 
able, the New Hampshire district court continued, a state could not exercise its common 
law to protect the writings o:r free them from protection. Id. at ll52-53. 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970). 
58. Id. § 27 states in relevant part that "nothing in this title shall be deemed to 
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession 
of which has been lawfully obtained." 
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tax does not restrict the right to sell, the Royalties Act, which no 
doubt affects the price, does not interfere with the transfer of 
the title for a consideration to another. 
More questionable is the court's position that the require-
ment to pay a royalty upon resale of a work of fine art is not a 
restriction on the free right of transfer of that work. Although 
the court concluded that such a royalty did not "impermissibly 
restrict"159 this right, it did not justify its conclusion. Congress 
particularly intended to foreclose any control over the article 
which is the subject of the copyright by the copyright owner af-
ter the owner makes the first sale.60 A royalty due to the artist, 
therefore, unlike a sales tax, would appear to conflict with fed-
erallegislation. Under this rationale, the Royalties Act would be 
preempted by federal copyright law. 
Preemption of the Royalties Act under the Copyright Revision 
Act of 1976 
The 1976 Act exclusively governs rights "equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights"61 given in other sections of the Act and 
applicable to the subject matter of copyright, as are wo.rks of 
fine art. 
The droit de suite may be parallel protection, different from 
copyright because it gives the artist a continuing financial inter-
est in the most profitable aspect of his or her endeavors-the 
resale of the original work itself-rather than in the reproduc-
tion from which authors and songwriters profit. Because of this 
difference in the character of works of fine art and other works 
of authorship, works of fine art should fall outside the scope of 
that part of the 1976 Act which gives the owner of a particular 
copy the free right to dispose of that copy.62 Under this view, 
59. 621 F.2d at 978. 
60. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Congo 2d Sess. (1909), reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, CoP-
YRIGHT at app. 13-25 (1980). The first sale doctrine provides that when a copyright own-
er, in this case an artist, parts with title to a particular piece of work he also divests 
himself of the exclusive right to sell that piece of work. The exclusive right to sell that 
piece of work then rests with the buyer. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 
1187 (9th Cir. 1977). 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a}(1976}. These exclusive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106 
are the rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, display the work publicly, and to pre-
pare derivative works. 
62. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a}(1976}. This section is merely a rewrite of § 27 of the 1909 Act. 
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federal law should not lpreempt state droit de suite legislation. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the 1976 Act, and of the pre-
emption section in particular, a section the House Committee on 
the Judiciary called a "bedrock provision,"6s is to promote a uni-
form national system of copyright protection, which would fur-
ther the basic constitutional aims of promoting writing and 
scholarship.64 The report stated: "The preemption of rights 
under State law is complete with respect to any work coming 
within the scope of the bill even though the scope of exclusive 
rights given the work. • . is narrower than the scope of common 
law rights in the work might have been."65 
The analysis of the courts with respect to whether a particu-
lar common law right is preempted under the 1976 Act should 
no longer be so dependent on the same occupation of the field 
and conflict considerations used under the 1909 Act in Morse-
burg and earlier preemption cases. Under the 1976 Act, Congress 
has attempted to occupy the field of copyright completely once a 
work has been fixed in a tangible medium of expression-as has 
any painting, drawing or sculpture.66 State droit de suite legisla-
tion pertaining to works of fine art would only be valid if the 
rights it afforded were different from any of the rights granted 
by the federal copyright laws. In other words, even state laws 
harmonious with the federal scheme would be preempted if they 
grant protections equivalent to those in the 1976 Act. 
Further, even some proponents of droit de suite recognize 
that it is a pecuniary right, "part of the author's copyright."6? So 
as federal law is presently written, the 1976 Copyright Act 
should preempt the California Resale Royalties Act. 
Nancy M. Lashnits* 
A "copy" means the original work or a copy of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
63. NOTES OF THE COMMl'ITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Congo 2d 
Sess. 129 (1976). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 131. 
66 .. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). 
67. SchuIder, Art Proceeds Act, 61 Nw. L. REv. 19, 22 (1966-67), note 28 supra. 
* J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 1980. 
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